Transcript: John Connally’s Role in the Planning of the Trip - Part 1
Assassination Symposium on JFK “CONNALLY” Breakout Session
Assassination Symposium on John F. Kennedy
November 18-22, 1993, Hyatt Regency Hotel at Reunion Square, Dallas Texas
Panel: New Leads & Revelations: Break-out Topics;
Topic: John Connally’s role in the planning of the trip. Date/Room: Saturday November 20, 1993/Cascade B
Speaker: George Michael Evica
ABSTRACT:
INTRODUCTION:
Welcome to ASK 1993 held in Dallas, Texas. This is session number 11, George M. Evica, New Leads and Revelations. Saturday, November 20, 1993.
MR. EVICA:
[Tape omits opening remarks] ...a two-day trip was scheduled insuring a fixed November 22 noon Dallas motorcade to the luncheon site; 5) then control of the specific Dallas luncheon site choice; 6) establishing unnecessary Dealey Plaza transit on the route to the luncheon site; 7) which further set up the killing turns in Dealey Plaza.
In addition, both before and after the assassinat... [voice over] Due to technical difficulties, there is a 30-second period of silence. [end voice over] this begun by Connally. According to Connally: “I really can’t help you. I have a really heavy responsibility as a governor. We’re starting a session that will run through June, so I won’t be able to get to that, the pressure you're putting on me to raise all that money in Texas,” says Connally. Connally objected that they could not have... [18 second gap] ...ends up raising money. From December of ‘62 to January of ‘63 the trip was under consideration by Vice President Johnson and Governor Connally for nearly a year; that is, no earlier than November of ‘62 and as late as January of ‘63. Maybe.
The Texas State Legislature began its first session on January 20, ‘63. A hundred and twenty days, it ended about June 3rd or 6th, just in time for the El Paso meeting.
Again, JFK wanted four or five fundraising dinners — there’s absolutely no truth to it — in major cities. There is no evidence of this JFK request except Connally’s testimony. According to Connally, however, [he knew] despite the fact they were talking about this sort of floating time to come to Texas, that the Texas trip decision to come to Texas was considered final. Now, if you keep hearing contradictions, that’s precisely what’s built into the record. Got it?
This: “It’s all conditional, and it may not happen, but it’s final. We've decided to do it.” Here: “It’s all conditional, and it’s final.” If you think that’s a contradiction. If you think that makes for a contradiction. If you think that makes for a kind of murkyness about the trip, I think it’s intended.
AUDIENCE:
A few months prior to the El Paso meeting — you’ve gone by LBJ’s visit in late April, where he said he’d be here in late November.
MR. EVICA:
I’m going to do it.
AUDIENCE:
Oh. Since you’d gone to El Paso, I wasn’t sure.
MR. EVICA:
I just wanted to jump to April 23, 1963 — thank you — JFK had apparently made his decision to visit Houston for the November 21st, 1963 Albert Thomas Dinner by April 23rd, 1963. Now, the only way that we found out about this, really, was the so-called threat to Nixon on the part of Oswald at the same period. The FBI then went out and checked all the Dallas newspapers to find out if, indeed, Nixon had been or was coming to Dallas. What he found — what they found out and what is in the twenty-six volumes, that indeed LBJ was in town. And he’s the one who announced the trip.
There are some problems with that, however. The Houston date is fixed. It’s November of ‘63. A possible Dallas visit, therefore, could be predicted because the Houston date is already, by April 23rd, November 21st, the evening of November 21st. Remember, April 23rd, we already know he’s going to be in Houston. If he goes to Dallas, it’s likely. Therefore, he will be in Dallas on on November 22nd. But LBJ apparently does not know what anyone else is doing because he gives the entire itinerary, including a scheduled dinner in Houston, but “on a one day visit in the near future.” He says, “My birthday might be that date.” He’s wrong. LBJ’s misleading announcement combines a JFK definite November itinerary for Texas with an earlier tentative but no longer possible LBJ birthday. Again, I think that’s intended. As the LBJ announcement was given before the El Paso meeting, it suggested that the LBJ birthday proposal had been made before the El Paso meeting, and that LBJ was still operating under the assumption that August 27th was the viable date.
Now, there is a whole pattern throughout this story of LBJ being left out of consideration. He complains three separate times, “No one is telling me anything. I keep on getting the wrong information. Connally has all the information. He’s not giving it to me.” Everyone else says, “Sorry LBJ.”
April 25th, an announcement was made in the Dallas Times Herald: JFK was to visit Dallas in November. Houston and Dallas were to be visited either on the 21st or on the 22nd.
June 5th, the meeting in El Paso on this date is viewed as crucial in the Texas trip planning story. (It is persistently called secret. In fact, secrecy runs through this whole story — that is — not reported to the media. I can assure you that’s a transcendent structural devise throughout this story. The meeting and its outcome might have been withheld in fact from many JFK associates for still unknown reasons; because they talk about the trip very late in their memoirs.) At the El Paso meeting [it] was confirmed as well as an original plan for a visit of one day (from Ashman’s study of Connally, and the source for Ashman’s book was Connally himself.
June 5th — Belin, who if anything, had an unclouded understanding of this period [Evica chuckles at this sarcasm], reported that June 5th meeting confirmed a late November ‘63 Texas trip date. Let’s go to June 5th. Again, according to Connally, Connally consented to a Texas trip at the El Paso Cortez Hotel meeting. But more realistically, Kennedy informed Governor Connally that he would make an official trip to Texas before the end of the year. In order to ensure that JFK would come to Texas no earlier than August 27th, that date was rejected before June 5th. Now we know that’s true because there is a deposition that tells us that, but again it’s buried in the 26 volumes. In fact, they knew that the President’s other commitments prevented him from coming to Texas any sooner than November 21st, the fixed date of the Houston Thomas dinner — the date that was finally set. Now, what about between June of ‘63 and October of ‘63?
According to Connally — again, no evidence — this period was marked by planning for the Texas trip. Connally testified that he and LBJ met from June to early October ‘63. By the way, that’s news to LBJ. Alright? There is nothing in his documents, nothing in in the library, nothing in his book that suggests they met intermittently to discuss, quote, “objectives and the format of the trip” — no documentary evidence whatsoever.
September 13th 1963, according to the front page of The Dallas Times Herald written by Bob Hollingsworth, Washington correspondent, The Dallas Times Herald learned Friday — remember, September 13th — from a source not given, that a one-day affair with a breakfast speech in Dallas, a luncheon in Fort Worth, an afternoon coffee in San Antonio, a dinner in Houston was scheduled. I repeat, again, the Houston date is fixed. So, every other comment that things are fluid is in opposition to the fact that JFK had chosen November 21st to go to Houston. The trip date — that trip date was fixed. The Dallas Times Herald confirmed that JFK would make at least a one-day visit to Texas on either the 21st or the 22nd.
I repeat, again, the Houston date is fixed. So, every other comment that things are fluid is in opposition to the fact that JFK had chosen November 21st to go to Houston. The trip date — that trip date was fixed.
September 13th through 24th, this period is crucial for Connally to win his argument resulting in a two-day visit. Now I have to write that part and I can only assure you that that’s a very intense period, when he maneuvers that fatigue factor to provoke JFK into accepting the idea that a fixed Dallas motorcade is where you want to go, The JFK people say we’ve got to reach the people. And Connally says, “Well I’m sorry, the only way you reach the people is in a motorcade. And in a one-day trip you can’t have a motorcade.”
Remember, Connally is in charge of all the details. They go to a two-day trip. They fix the motorcade on the 22nd. So between September 13th and September 24th, 1963, you establish a two-day trip with a Dallas motorcade. Hear it? Alright.
Let’s go now to September 26th. As a member of the Warren Commission, Allen Dulles had done his own newspaper research. Citing The Dallas Morning News of September 26th, he reads the headlines, “Kennedy to visit Texas, November 21st, 22nd.” And quote, “Dallas included” unquote. According to Dulles, this information in The Dallas Morning News was quote, “reported from Jackson Hole, Wyoming” where the President was then on a visit. Dulles quoted from The Dallas Morning News, “White House sources from Jackson Hole, Wyoming told the Dallas News exclusively Wednesday night that President Kennedy will will visit Texas November 21st and 22nd.”
Note: These September announcement dates are traceable to a source unnamed from JFK’s midwest tour — not from Washington D.C.— to Jackson Hole, Wyoming, to an unnamed presidential party person called “White House sources.” The Jackson Hole, Wyoming announcement confirms the earliest September 13th ‘63 story, established November 21st and November 22nd as the Texas visiting date, but it’s a highly unusual way to give out information.
The final White House decision to make the trip to Texas came late Tuesday night, September 24th. These sources said — again, unnamed — that is the final decision for a two-day trip. So sometime, as I said, between the 13th and the 24th, you go from a one-day trip to a two-day trip. And someone in Wyoming, an unnamed White House source, speaks for the White House and establishes a two-day trip.
Note that the Jackson Hole announcements are attributed to an unnamed person or persons on tour. I have not been able to find out so far who that was. Who was on the trip? Who sent the stories out of Jackson Hole, Wyoming? Why did one Dallas newspaper, The Dallas Morning News, have what it called an exclusive on these Jackson Hole announcements? White House or presidential announcements are usually sent out to all the press associations and news services and given to the White House correspondents in Washington. Why, in this instance, were announcements sent from Jackson Hole and why were they sent exclusively just to one paper in Dallas?
September 26th, Dulles, on the Warren Commission, questioned [Secret Service Agent Winston] Lawson closely on this issue. “Lawson: I was going to Billings Montana as the advance man at the time, from the time the announcement was made from Jackson Hole. JFK left Billings to go to Jackson Hole and then returned the next morning again to Billings.”
Dulles then asks Lawson, “You don’t recall having heard that Texas announcement?” And Lawson said, “No.” Before October 1963, the Texas trip dates were set, according to the House Select Committee on Assassinations. But the House Committee recognized that Connally wasn’t telling them the truth, and therefore, they acknowledged it, but they buried it in the 11th volume, pages 510 and 511.
Connally said that the trip was not fixed before October — before late October. And what they placed there was this: “Connally did acknowledge (to the House Select Committee on Assassinations) that he must have known prior to October that November 21st and 22nd were in fact the selected dates for the Texas visit.”
Now, throughout this history, what you find is the fact that once you get someone to admit it, the dates are fixed, not fluid. But Connally continues to insist they are fluid, that they are changeable. Got it? So that you have the major contradiction working.
If you let him say it — and he said it, by the way, to Reston Jr. in Lone Star Rising. And Reston had not read the entire record, so he allows Connally to tell him literally untruths. Reston, by the way, was quite skeptical of a good part of the Connally story, but he should have been skeptical of most of it.
The Connally story, by the way, that Connally urged JFK to come to Texas during the October 4th ‘63 meeting — Connally said, “I went there.” And he said, “Gee you really ought to come to Texas.” What’s wrong with that story? What’s wrong with it is that Connally lies. Because as of April 23rd, September 13th, September 26th — right? — the trip is already set. Yet Connally is able to tell people that — who have not read the record — that he went to JFK and said, “Since it’s only tentative, do come to Texas.” Now, why then would we have a reverse of that story? Well, if Connally knew prior to October that JFK would be in Texas on November 21st and 22nd, Connally could not have urged JFK on October 4th to come to Texas. Connally’s urging must have been related to a different topic.
And JFK confirmed to Evelyn Lincoln, his secretary, that though Johnson wanted JFK in Texas, his chief concern was not that party break, not JFK coming to Texas, but keeping LBJ on the national ticket. I’ll explain that later.
The House Select Committee on Assassinations did not follow up its suspicions despite clear indications that it suspected Connally of not telling the truth about the Texas trip. The House Select Committee on Assassinations allowed Connally to be its chief source for the Texas trip, though his testimony was clearly self-serving and a number of times obviously false. October 2nd ‘63, by the way, Connally met with the power structure in Dallas. It’s incredible the people that he met here. The chairman of the Dallas Citizens’ Council.
The House Select Committee on Assassinations allowed Connally to be its chief source for the Texas trip, though his testimony was clearly self-serving and a number of times obviously false.
AUDIENCE:
What was the date?
MR. EVICA:
October 2nd ‘63, he’s really setting it up. You notice he’s going to ask JFK to come to Dallas. And he’s meeting on October 2nd about JFK coming to Dallas. Until I did the chronology, no one has seen the major contradiction. Who’s he meeting with? The chairman of the Dallas controlled — the chairman of the Dallas Citizens’ Council, which had controlled Dallas politics for forty years, the president of the Chamber of Commerce, the head of the Mercantile Bank the oldest bank in Dallas, and all the executives, the chief executives from the two Dallas newspapers. You know, power to the people. It’s that liberal, Democratic coalition that we’re all fond of. [Evica chuckles] October 3rd...
AUDIENCE:
All Republicans.
MR. EVICA:
Not necessarily, but...
AUDIENCE:
They may be Democrats but they’re conservative as hell down here.
MR. EVICA:
That’s absolutely true.
AUDIENCE:
That’s all a part of what’s going on down there.
MR. EVICA:
October 3rd, by the way, he holds a D.C. meeting of Texas Democrats. He's extraordinarily nervous. He is right on the edge of breaking, and Gonzalez gives him hell because Connally betrays that what he thinks is necessary is to get monied people to support the Democratic Party. And Gonzalez says, “Stick it in your ear,” and, “The people are more important.” That’s a marvelous, by the way, confrontation. It’s not been covered very much, and we ought to get the Henry Gonzalez story very soon. Yes.
AUDIENCE:
Does it have to do with why they had the choice between the Trade Mart and the Women’s Building?
MR. EVICA:
I’ll get to it. That’s crucial. October 4th, according to Belin, with Connally as Belin’s chief source, if not the only source, Connally got general Texas trip planning authority at that meeting on October 3rd. More to the point, I know that what he got was his Dallas planning authority. Verified.
October 4th, according to JFK, who apparently commented after that meeting to Mrs. Lincoln, his secretary, Connally was quote, “very anxious,” unquote, to have JFK visit Texas. By the way, when Connally says, “I went on October 3rd and urged the President not to come to Texas,” I’ve got a direct quote — he lied.
AUDIENCE:
I think you said October 4th and the 3rd is the wrong...
MR. EVICA:
October 4th, yes. That’s me. Thank you. October 4th, according to JFK, yeah, he tells Mrs. Lincoln, his secretary, “Connally’s very anxious to have JFK visit Texas.” But according to Connally, Kennedy tentatively set the second half of November as the trip time.
Connally’s version of this White House meeting, by the way, placed this JFK trip decision far too late — that’s part of the fluidity — since both the November dates for Houston and Dallas are now already set. Connally testifies, therefore, he met with JFK in the Oval Office and he said JFK demands multiple fund-raising meetings. None of that is, apparently, true.
October 5th, again according to Connally, Connally was negative in his meeting with JFK about a one-day trip to Texas, which might include a Dallas motorcade. By the way, that again is untrue because a two-day trip has already been settled. Yet Connally now says, “What we talked about was a one-day trip with the possibility of a motorcade.” That means what Connally is doing is making very certain that they focus in on the motorcade in Dallas because he’s got to control it.
Connally is the single source for this curious story since the two-day trip had already been decided on. The story was possibly generated by Connally’s continuing concern for absolute choice for the Dallas luncheon site and hence the motorcade route from Love Field to the luncheon.
October — probably — October 5th, The New York Times indicated, “Some doubt had been raised at the Connally-JFK meeting about JFK coming to Dallas.” The source was John Connally. On November — oh lets see. Connally probably argued for a scheduled November 22nd ‘63 noontime Dallas motorcade from Love Field to the luncheon speech site — speech site. I say that he probably argued for it because all the evidence suggests that now — that’s his intention now: to focus on that as part of his — as part of the argument.
By the way, October 16th, Oswald went to the Texas School Book Depository. Note that since JFK announced his Texas trip as early as April 23rd — St. George’s Day, a major holiday in Britain, right? And if you were hearing one of the other presentations, you would know that Adele Edison1 was told that one Lee Harvey Oswald was going to be involved in an assassination of John F. Kennedy. When I told her April 23rd is an extraordinarily important date because there is a confluence of events, she was astonished. She said, “April 23rd?” I said, “April 23rd, that’s your date? That’s one of my dates.” Oswald went to the Texas School Book Depository because — you remember the Texas trip is as early announced as April 23rd and since Dallas had been included in the trip quite early, no later than mid-September, this move of Oswald’s, placing Oswald in the Texas School Book Depository, is not late, as some sources have argued, especially those who are arguing only for an opportunistic assassination. I think that Oswald was placed at the Texas School Book Depository — in fact, if you count days — just ten days after Connally’s control of the Texas trip is confirmed.
Oswald was placed at the Texas School Book Depository — in fact, if you count days — just ten days after Connally’s control of the Texas trip is confirmed.
AUDIENCE:
In other words, you think it’s final that the date was set on September 26th? — the final date that they announced in the Dallas Times Herald [sic, i.e. Dallas Morning News] out of Jackson Hole, Wyoming?
MR. EVICA:
The final dates were announced...
AUDIENCE:
September 26th out of Jackson Hole, Wyoming by the White House source?
MR. EVICA:
That’s right. That’s right.
AUDIENCE:
So they knew on September 26th the dates until — he moved in almost about three weeks after.
MR. EVICA:
Yes. Yes. But I took the — the — a very last date that still gives them ten days. Alright? Hang in there.
The trip — I move out of my time trip to give you some more information. According to the official Texas trip history, JFK’s major reason for coming to Texas was either to unite a disunited Texas Democratic Party or to bolster his own weakened political standing in Texas. Some commentators even made Texas the nail in the familiar [story] — for want of the nail the shoe was lost, for want of the shoe the horse was lost, for want of the horse the soldier was lost, and then the battle. Right? And then the war. So they made Texas very important. They still talk about it as really crucial.
But neither of these reasons is, in fact, remotely true. Both so-called explanations of the Texas trip are and continue to be part of pseudo-history of JFK’s trip to Texas. LBJ also presented his own post-assassination version. It’s too long, it’s filled with errors, it’s based partly on Connally, it’s self-serving, and it’s — there’s much disinformation in it.
On October 3rd, 1963, President Kennedy, says LBJ, met with Governor Connally, and they agreed on the November date. Something wrong with that?
AUDIENCE:
They already agreed on September 26th.
MR. EVICA:
They already agreed on it. This LBJ statement is simply untrue. The October ‘63 meeting was too late to establish the November date. LBJ is repeating Connally’s Warren Commission testimony, later apparently found suspect by the House Select Committee on Assassinations.
Now in ‘67, Robert Sherrill, in The Accidental President — the title is wrong — analyzed the trip and made very important comments that have been totally ignored. Robert Sherrill doubted Connally’s credibility on the motives for the Dallas trip.
AUDIENCE:
What was the last name again?
MR. EVICA:
Sherrill. Oddly unquestioning, the Warren Commission accepted the explanation of Governor Connally that JFK, according to Connally, wished to resolve the factional controversy within the Democratic Party of Texas before the election of ‘64. Sherrill says, “This is the kind of nearly truthful statement that is disastrous to history,” unquote.
Mine now: A terrible division was indeed destroying the Texas Democratic Party, but it was not the official divisional fiction. It was not the Connally divisional fiction. It was not LBJ’s fiction. Actually, the Democratic Party in Texas was being torn apart by the same controversy that had been shaking the Texas Democratic structure for a dozen years, which in ‘63 had taken a new turning.
The liberals believed they were within only a few months of smashing the Johnson-Connally, Washington-Austin axis. They did not want the controversy resolved except at the election booth. In ‘63, JFK was neither in trouble politically — don’t believe them — nor did he perceive himself to be in trouble, as a number of revisionist historians, the Warren Commission, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations would have us believe.
In ‘63, JFK was neither in trouble politically … nor did he perceive himself to be in trouble, as a number of revisionist historians, the Warren Commission, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations would have us believe.
Quote, “It seemed likely that Mr. Kennedy would be running against Senator Goldwater. The polls showed him running ahead of Goldwater, and it looked as though he might be well on his way to a big presidential and congressional victory. Just before going to Dallas, the President was sending out positive political signals.” Now you have to begin reading non-assassination books. That’s not a criticism. I’m telling you, if you begin to look at major texts in domestic policy, foreign policy, memoirs, etc. by political historians, political scientists, and historians, you find that there is a whole other Kennedy out there that you’re not being given information about. Quote, “He was supremely confident of his own reelection. The religious problem, which had cost him four or five percentage points in 1960, now seemed dead. The national polls showed him exceptionally popular, easily defeating any possible Republican candidate.” Equally important, they indicated that the country was moving quietly but firmly leftward. And the public strongly favored his activist agenda including, except the South, civil rights.
The national polls showed him exceptionally popular, easily defeating any possible Republican candidate.” Equally important, they indicated that the country was moving quietly but firmly leftward.
If the Republicans nominated Goldwater as seemed increasingly likely, Kennedy expected to win in a landslide, sweeping up big Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress. This is an analysis by a professor emeritus out of the University of California. It’s a major text on John F. Kennedy’s domestic policy. His name is Bernstein. B-e-r-n-s-t-e-i-n. It’s an extremely balanced analysis of domestic policy and a very important book. There are about four of them out there.
The New York Times religiously avoids these books. O’Donnell cited JFK’s, quote, “simple eagerness to get the ‘64 campaign off to a strong early start.” The coming election year looked good, the economy was booming, the Saturn-one rocket was to be fired in December of ‘63. By November 12th 1963 — well, rockets, you know — John — rockets.
By November 12th, 1963, at least one major political strategy session was held by JFK and his closest political advisors to plan the ‘64 campaign. The Texas trip might not have been as a polit — started as a political venture, but it became one by the middle of November ‘63.
But Governor Connally was in trouble. On November 22nd, the Houston Chronicle — they’re sticking it to him — published a poll — I doubt whether it was accurate — showing that Kennedy-Johnson popularity was trailing Goldwater 48-to-52 percent. Do you notice they have no undecideds in that poll? It’s remarkable.
Given all the other more positive polls, this one was probably skewed so that the Chronicle could make its Texas political point. In the Chronicle’s opinion, quote, “Connally could have real difficulties being elected next year.” Allen Duckworth, political editor of the highly conservative Dallas Morning News, wrote in the fall of ‘63 that a big switch of conservative Democrats to the Republican primary, which many anticipated, could be disastrous to those who controlled the state Democratic machinery. And if Connally did not have control of the next state convention, and if it then did not endorse Johnson for a second term as vice president, then he might not get it.
Connally’s political future was threatened: 1) conservative Connally Democrats could lose control of the Texas Democratic Party and the crucial primary contest between — against the new liberal coalition. A strong possibility. 2) The conservative Connally Democrats would then be unable to control the Texas state Democratic convention. 3) That now liberal state Democratic convention, predictably, would decline to endorse LBJ for the vice presidency, [and] certainly ignore him for a senatorial slot. 4) JFK would say, “Hey,” and dump LBJ.
John Connally, therefore, could — would then not only lose control of the Texas Democratic party but also risk defeat in the gubernatorial race and the end of his political career. Anti-Connally forces, therefore, were gathering great, great strength.
A new liberal organization called the Democratic Coalition — “Negroes...” — I’m quoting from a very early text: “Negroes, labor, independents, liberals, Mexicans, backed by a hefty foundation grant, registered and organized these voters in the major Texas urban areas.” By November ‘63 a very strong liberal coalition threatened to turn traditional Texas politics upside down. In addition to the emerging brown and black power politics, the Kennedy Administration was busy in Texas — the Kennedy Administration — in registering and organizing liberal Democratic support in other minority groups.
I’ve got a long section on the poll tax, by the way, and Connally made the terrible mistake of supporting the poll tax. And the Gonzalez-Yarborough-black-labor — an enormous coalition — came down hard on him. He made a very bad political mistake. He stubbornly resisted liberal demands for a repeal of the tax. Connally had eliminated, therefore, all populist and liberal support.
The contradictions of his relationships, the JFK administration, tenuous as they were, and the loss of Democratic conservatives to the Texas Republicans all threatened his electoral future.
By the way, October ‘63 was — [he] was in worse trouble with the federal government. A federal court had ruled that all the congressional districts of Texas were unconstitutional. You know what that means to local politics. All subsequent elections would have to be held at large until the Texas legislature was able to design an acceptable plan for reapportionment. Governor Connally refused to call a special session of the legislature. And that liberal coalition, the black, the brown, the labor, and all the others, said, “We're going to get you.”
Labor had patched up its differences — was united again. On November 21st, top labor executives in Texas would be having a major party in Houston, swearing fealty to the cause of defeating Connally in the next election. And even the steel workers were going to be there, and that meant labor strength.
The Johnson-Connally combination had still another potent factor working against it. I don’t know if you know about the Senator Yarborough attempts, with great success apparently, to block Johnson from returning to Texas to run both for the vice presidency and the Senate. There was a major — again in Austin — dinner planned for October 19th. And that was going to bring senators from the U.S. Congress, in support of Yarborough, against the Connally-Johnson combination, from South Carolina, Montana, Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho — Congressmen Jack Brooks and Henry Gonzalez, who hated John Connally’s guts but it was mutual between them, both of Texas, would be attending — and include a filmed message by Mr. Kennedy. Heavy. Eight other prominent senators — I mean, the President was going to send a film to them — eight other prominent senators sent supporting messages, including one Ted Kennedy. LBJ, by the way, did not attend that October 19th dinner.
In November ‘63, John Connally was in such serious political trouble that only — this is an analysis from Ashman from that time — only a personal presidential visit might bail him out. Whether or not the visit would solve or intensify any of his problems was a moot question.
People who had analyzed Kennedy’s position in the White House at this time, then, in relationship to that fight [say] Kennedy wanted no part of the Connally-Texas problems. JFK was unwilling to support either LBJ or Connally. Though Kennedy had earlier agreed that LBJ controlled Texas patronage, the turning of the Democratic tide meant that Texas was getting away from LBJ. Therefore, both Connally and LBJ were in trouble.
Kennedy intimates have verified that Kennedy was not going to Texas to mend anyone’s Democratic fences despite the repetition of the Warren Commission, House Select Committee on Assassinations, LBJ and Connally. All those assertions are simply not true. The ‘64 election was coming up, the Democrats in Texas were split into warring factions, and Johnson, so the story said, had insisted on the President going down there to “patch things up.” “But that” — I’m quoting now from another source — “wasn’t the trip we planned.” Now if you're wondering about it, this is an early Kenny O’Donnell statement: “That wasn’t the trip we planned. Nor was it a disgruntled and peevish president, as you’ve heard, who,” as several versions of the official trip fiction so characterized him, “we saw boarding Air Force One.”
Kennedy intimates have verified that Kennedy was not going to Texas to mend anyone’s Democratic fences despite the repetition of the Warren Commission, House Select Committee on Assassinations, LBJ and Connally. All those assertions are simply not true.
“I feel great,” he said to Kenny O’Donnell. “My back feels better than it’s felt in years.” “And along with his good health,” says O’Donnell, “Dave Powers and I never saw him in a happier mood.”
“If the trip to Texas were not something special,” said Kenny O'Donnell, “for the President, not just some tiresome feud-patching chore, he would not have made it the occasion of his wife’s first appearance on a presidential campaign tour much to the delight and astonishment of all of us.”
So despite John Connally’s distaste for both JFK and for liberal Democratic principles, and regardless of the very real problem of being perceived as a JFK Washington agent, especially if JFK was coming to Texas, Connally needed JFK because Connally needed LBJ. LBJ had to stay on that vice presidential ticket. And if he stayed on the vice presidential ticket, then they controlled the state convention [and] Connally is safe. Without Johnson on the vice presidential ticket Connally’s plans for his own future in Texas and possibly the national stage would be in shambles.
Evelyn Lincoln, in still another memoir, recalled Connally’s visit to the White House in October concerning the Texas trip. Quote, “After I left, I remember what Mr. Kennedy said.” And she quotes him: “He Sure seemed anxious for me to go to Texas.”
Do you remember he said he urged the President not to come to Texas? “He sure seemed anxious for me to come to Texas. He attracts some people, you know. Money people who would never vote for me. But I have many supporters down there who are bitterly opposed to him. I think in the long run, it would be more advantageous to him than for me that I go to Texas. And the one thing I noticed above everything else was his concern about Lyndon being on the ticket.”
Secrecy, the entire Texas trip was marked by secrecy, withheld information, unexplained shifting of dates and times, which were, in fact, set disinformation. The Secret Service, the White House staff, and the public were not informed about the details of the trip until just weeks before it occurred. The reason for that is that Connally had absolute control over the information on the whole trip, on Dallas, on the luncheon site and on the motorcade. In effect, only LBJ, JFK and Connally — and LBJ frequently got wrong information — knew the details of the trip. And even LBJ was either misinformed or not given important data.
Why did JFK decide to visit Texas? Sometime apparently, in early ‘63 anticipating the ‘64 presidential campaign, Kenneth O’Donnell, LBJ, and John Kennedy discussed a future political trip to Texas. In O’Donnell’s testimony to the Warren Commission: For O'Donnell, significant political reasons clearly explain JFK’s intent, at some future time, to visit LBJ’s home state. And that political intent on JFK’s part was prior to any possible talk of divisional conflicts within the Texas Democratic Party and, therefore, a trip to repair those divisions.
David Belin again says the same thing. Discussion of the Texas trip summarizes the trip succinctly. On June 5th, 1963, JFK, Connally, and LBJ met in El Paso and agreed that the President should make a one-day whirlwind trip to Dallas and three other Texas cities in late November. Initially, the proposed trip involved no motorcades because there was not time. Got it? So, in a 13-day period, September 13th through 26th approximately, what Connally apparently has to do is argue successfully the fatigue factor, initiate a two-day trip, and therefore a motorcade on November 22nd.
The best available evidence clearly indicates that JFK, after receiving an important and personal invitation to go to Texas, then chose to go for his own reasons. Not because of Connally, not because of LBJ, not because of Yarborough. Yet this evidence has been obscured and minimized by the Connally and LBJ scenarios that incurious media reporters, investigating commissions and committees, and biographers and historians have naively accepted.
When the House Select Committee on Assassinations had a chance to get at the truth, it chose the least reliable witness — that sounds right doesn’t it? — the least reliable witness to the trip to Texas, opening its public hearings with his suspect testimony: John Connally of Texas.
Now, if you’ve got a recording — Robert Cutler supplied me with a recording of all the hearings, and I went back to cassettes number one and two. And I wish George O’Toole would come back and bring his psychological stress evaluator with him. I don’t know if you know about the — when you’re not under stress and this [graph that resembles a drawing of a hedge], and the trimmed hedge when you’re under stress. I can tell you, I can hear it in his voice. When he’s giving testimony to the House Select Committee on Assassinations, he’s trimming the hedge.
What initially prompted JFK to begin planning a Texas trip? I mean, I find this astonishing that it’s publicly available but you need to dig. Representative Albert Thomas of North Houston and its suburbs was the catalyst. John F. Kennedy probably would have gone to Texas in ‘63 but he decided definitely to go — to go to Houston on November 21st ‘63 solely because Representative Albert Thomas of Texas wanted him to go.
Kenny O’Donnell testified to the Warren Commission that, quote, “An invitation to the President had been received from Thomas or his committee.” And he says, “Oh, wait a minute, not the Congressman himself” — I know what he’s talking about — “and the President was very fond of Congressman Thomas and I knew he would want to go if at all possible. I would think,” he said — remember he told this to the Warren Commission — “I would think that the invitation to the Thomas dinner probably had more to do with setting the actual definite dates of November 21st and 22nd to visit Texas than anything else.”
Kenny O’Donnell testified to the Warren Commission that, “An invitation to the President had been received from Thomas or his committee.” And he says, “Oh, wait a minute, not the Congressman himself”— I know what he’s talking about.
Larry O’Brien testified to the crucial Albert Thomas request to the President. He was questioned closely during his Warren Commission testimony. Warren Commission — three or four of those lawyers knew what was going on, I think. Testified — he was asked closely by Warren Commission test... — in his testimony by Commission Council Adams.
“Adams: Is it fair to say that the substantial purpose of this Texas trip was initially political?” That is, following the official scenarios.
“O’Brien: In my belief it was not a substantial purpose. An invitation had been extended by Congressman Albert Thomas’ dinner committee. The original substantial purpose, and I assume arrangements that were appropriate for that time for one fund raising dinner organized by Connally in Austin contributed to the decision for going to Texas in late November at that particular time for this Texas trip.”
This would be typical of other such situations where you knew there would be an occasion with a specific fixed date, such as the Thomas dinner in Houston. And then you’d build another set of visits around it. O’Brien confirmed that JFK was most interested in attending the Thomas dinner to honor Thomas.
He testified, O’Brien did, that some months before the trip O’Brien was party to discussions that involved O’Brien as to specific stops on the trip.
O’Brien further testified that JFK was earlier interested in visiting Texas but the Thomas invitation was — sort of fell into line. It presented an opportunity to make the Texas trip definite at that time.
JFK was particularly fond of Thomas. The President had a close working relationship with him in Congress. In Larry O’Brien’s opinion, the trip would not have been undertaken at all except for the testimonial dinner for the powerful Congressman Albert Thomas of Houston. O’Brien was interviewed about the trip planning by Ralph Martin. Asked why JFK went to Texas, “Mr. O’Brien, why did John F. Kennedy go to Texas?” O’Brien answered, I quote, “Jack Kennedy would not have gone to Texas except that Al Thomas loved him,” unquote.
Representative Albert Thomas, a powerful member of the Texas delegation, friend and ally of John F. Kennedy, dying of terminal cancer, requested that the President of the United States, that he had strongly supported through 1963, attend a testimonial dinner in his honor in Houston on November 21st 1963.
O’Brien: “Once the Houston visit was agreed upon, we then made plans for other Texas stops.” Early in the Texas trip planning O’Brien remembered that JFK said, “Well since we’re going down for the dinner let’s put together a package.” And he suggested including a visit to the new aerospace medical center at Brooks Air Force Base in San Antonio because he had been urged by the Secretary of the Air Force, Eugene Zuckert, to take a look at it. Others strongly suggested a visit to Fort Worth — that controversial TFX, hundred and eleven fighter plane contract recently won by General Dynamics.
Council Adams (got O’Brien there under oath on Dallas): “Do you know how it came about that Dallas was chosen as one of the cities to visit?” O’Brien said, “Dallas was an obvious stop if you’re going to be in the state for two or two-and-a-half days.” O’Brien confirmed, despite Connally’s disinformation given in testimony both to the Commission and the House Select Committee...
[End of Tape 1, Side A,]
CONTINUED IN PART 22
ENDNOTES:
Adele Edison: https://spartacus-educational.com/JFKedisen.htm; https://www.kennedysandking.com/obituaries/adele-edison-passes-away-at-88
Richard Bartholomew, “Transcript: John Connally’s Role in the Planning of the Trip - Part 2,” bartholoviews.substack.com